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Abstract
Although the Bank of Canada admits asset prices are considered in its policy deliberations
because of their e¤ects on ination or output gap, the Bank of Canada denies trying to stabilize
asset prices around fundamental values. However, since the start of the Bank of Canada we have
seen a boom as well as a bust in the stock market. Are we to believe that the Bank of Canada did
not react to these stock market uctuations, apart from their impact consequences on economy?
We investigate this issue by using a structural model based on the New Keynesian framework
that is augmented by a stock market variable. We use an econometric method that allows us to
distinguish the direct e¤ect of stock prices on Bank of Canada policy rates from indirect e¤ects via
ination or GDP. Our results suggest that stock market stabilization plays a larger role in Bank
of Canada interest rate decisions than it is willing to admit. Furthermore, these results should
give new relevant insights into the inuence of stock market index prices on monetary policy
in Canada and should provide relevant insights regarding the opportunities and limitations of
incorporating nancial indicators in monetary policy decision making. They should give nancial
market participants, such as analysts, bankers and traders, a better understanding of the impact of
stock market index prices on the Bank of Canada policy. The results imply that the preferences
of the monetary authority have changed between the di¤erent subperiods. In particular, the
parameter associated with the implicit target of ination has been reduced signicantly. The
ndings suggest that the introduction of ination targeting in Canada was accompanied by a
fundamental change in the objectives of monetary policy, not only with respect to the average
target, but also in terms of precautions taken to keep ination in check in the face of uncertainty
about the economy.
2
1 Introduction
The study of Central Bank behaviour has attracted considerable interest in recent years. Atten-
tion has focused on two rather di¤erent issues. One has to do with whether Taylors rule (Taylor,
1993) adequately describes Central bank behaviour. However, empirical evidence suggests that
actual interest rate policy appears more cautious than might be expected based on Taylor rule
specication (e.g., see Clarida etal. 1999; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). On other hand, one
has the establishment of the appropriate monetary policy response to asset price movements.
Should the Central Bank care about the nancial instability associated with large asset price
uctuations? This question whether central banks should react to asset prices has regained in-
terest of policymakers and academics after the Japanese asset price bubble in the late 1980s,
the new technology stock market boom in the late 1990s, and the recent nancial and economic
crisis (2007). In fact, the recent nancial crisis has shown that the economic consequences of
nancial instability can be devastating. The pre-crisis consensus that asset prices should only
a¤ect monetary policy decisions insofar as they a¤ect ination or output gap, has come under
discussion.
Recent analyses of central bank behaviour begin with a policy objective function and construct
policy rule by optimizing the objective function subject to a system of constraints. In fact,
central banks set interest rates based on ination considerations, taking into account growth
developments as well. This standard approach to monetary policy implies that stock prices only
enter the deliberations of central banks insofar asset prices a¤ect ination or GDP. An alternative
policy approach is that the central bank actively tries to stabilize asset prices around fundamental
values or attempts to prick certain asset price bubbles. To contribute to this discussion, we ask
whether the basic Taylor rule could instead be augmented with an alternative variable that collects
and synthesises the information from the asset and nancial markets, i.e. whether central banks
are targeting the relevant economic information contained in a group of nancial variables and
not simply targeting each nancial variable.
The role of asset prices is an important issue considered in some studies. However, no con-
sensus was reached about whether the central bank should or not target this kind of variables.
Cecchetti et al. (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002), Goodhart and Hofmann (2002), Chadha et
al. (2004) and Rotondi and Vaciago (2005) consider important that central banks target asset
prices and provide strong support and evidence in that direction. On the contrary, Bernanke and
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Gertler (1999, 2001) and Bullard and Schaling (2002) do not agree with an exante control over
asset prices. They consider that, once the predictive content of asset prices for ination has been
accounted for, monetary authorities should not respond to movements in assets prices. Instead,
central banks should act only if it is expected that they a¤ect ination forecast or after the burst
of a nancial bubble in order to avoid damages to the real economy. Morever, Dri¢ ll et al. (2006)
analyse the interactions between monetary policy and the futures market in the context of a linear
reaction function. They nd evidence supporting the inclusion of futures prices in the central
banks reaction function as a proxy for nancial stability. The issue of nancial stability is also
investigated by Montagnoli and Napolitano (2005). They build and use a nancial conditional
indicator that includes the exchange rate, share prices and housing prices in the estimation of
a Taylor rule for some central banks. Their results show that this indicator can be helpful in
modelling the conduct of monetary policy.
To empirically analyze the role of asset prices, these authors used either the standard Taylor
rule or augmented Taylor rule, which describes how the central bank adjusts interest rates in
response to ination, the output gap, and stock prices. The use of this Taylor rule to draw
inferences about the behaviour of the central bank is not without criticism (Judd and Rudebusch,
1998; Dennis, 2006). An important issue concerns the interpretation of the Taylor rule. A
Reaction policy rule may be observed, following Sevensson (1997), as the result of an optimization
of an intertemporal loss function subject to two equations describing the structure of the economy.
In general, the arguments of the loss function are the gap between expected and target ination,
and the output gap. The important issue in this context is that the parameters of the reaction
function rule are convolutions of the original parameters associated to the preferences of the
central bank and the structure of the economy.
In light of the above problem Dennis (2006) advocates modelling the Feds behaviour by
specifying its objective function and then deriving its optimal interest rate rule, conditional on a
particular model for the US economy. The Feds interest rate rule can be estimated jointly with
the structural model, imposing any cross-equation restrictions. This approach allows the Feds
preference parameters to be identied and to examine whether they actually change over time.
Dennis uses the structural approach to examine if there has been a change in Fed preferences. He
considers two sub-periods (1961:1 to 1979:3) and (1982:1 to 2000:2) The central bank is assumed to
have a quadratic loss function characterized by three parameters: an ination target () ; a weight
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on output gap stabilization () and a weight on interest rate stabilization (). Favero and Rovelli
(2003) also use the structural framework to examine the Fed preferences. However, rather than
solving for the optimal interest rate rule, Favero and Rovelli use the Feds rst-order condition
- its Euler equation- along with a structural model of the economy, to estimate Fed preferences.
They argue that estimate an interest rate rule in a single equation specication is not a good
advise, except if the researcher is only interested in the behaviour of the coe¢ cient associated to
the gap between expected and ination target. Following this recommendation, Rodriguez (2008)
estimated in case of Canada a three equations system, allowing for the possibility to retrieve the
structural parameters associated to the preferences of the monetary authority and the structure
of the economy.
Considering these developments, our contribution is simply to estimate a reaction function
rule for the Canada, where the information from some nancial variables is accounted for to shed
some more light on its importance. In this paper we adopt the basic approach recommended by
Favero and Rovelli (2003) in modelling the behaviour of the Bank of Canada for the period 1961:1
to 2008:4. In others words, to estimate a Taylor rule augmented, this paper considers a system
of equations that takes into account not only the structure of the economy and the parameters of
the central bank loss function but also a stock market variable. We approximate the preferences
of the Bank of Canada with a quadratic loss function. We assume that the Bank of Canada only
cares not only about deviations of ination around some target, in deviations in the output gap
and smoothing the nominal interest rate but also consider a loss function which take into account
the uctuations of asset prices. The mains di¤erence between our analysis and the previous work
lies with the structure of our model for the Canadian economy. In their studies both Dennis,
Favero and Rovelli and Rodriguez use a purely backward-looking model of economy (aggregate
demand and supply) without e¤ect of stock prices. In contrast our model of economy contains
three equations (aggregate demand, supply and dynamic equation of asset price). In seeking to
estimate the Bank of Canadas preferences (and other structural parameters) we follow Favero
and Rovelli and work with the Euler equation for optimal policy, the aggregate demand curve,
the Phillips curve and dynamic Euler equation of asset price.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The empirical results are
presented and discussed in section 3. Section 4 o¤ers the main ndings of this paper and concludes.
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2 The Model: Structural Estimates of Central Bank Preferences
We use a structural backward-looking model of a closed economy that allows for the e¤ect of asset
prices on aggregate demand. The model augments the standard Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997)
specication by taking into account asset prices. Aggregate supply is the result of rms that
set the prices for their products so as to maximize prots in a monopolistic competition setting.
The setup of the New-Keynesian model in this study is rather standard and follows largely well-
known expositions such as McCallum and Nelson (1999) and is similar, e.g., to Giordani (2004),
Muscatelli, Tirelli, and Trecroci (2004), Svensson (2000), Leitemo, Roisland, and Torvik (2002),
Jensen (2002), Moons et al. (2007) and others.
2.1 The Structure of the Economy
Following standard assumptions in the New-Keynesian literature [see among others Gali and
Gertler (1999); Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005); Moons, C. et al. (2007)], we assume the
following specications for aggregate demand :
xt+1 = 1xt   2(it   t+1) + 3st + "xt+1 (1.1)
where x denotes the output gap, i the short-term nominal interest rate,  the ination rate, s
the stock market price index (asset prices) and "x is an aggregate demand shock. All variables are
in logarithms and refer to deviations from an initial steady state. The structural parameters can
be interpreted as partial elasticities. Equation (1:1) is consistent with the specication employed
by Walsh (1998), Ball (1999), and Svensson (1997) with one important di¤erence: aggregate
demand depends positively on the past level of asset prices via consumption wealth e¤ects and
investment balance sheet e¤ects. For example, a persistent decrease in the level of stock prices
increases the perceived level of householdsnancial distress causing a reduction in consumption
spending. The balance sheet channel implies a positive relationship between the rmsability
to borrow and their net worth, which in turn depends on asset valuations. There is a vast
amount of empirical evidence indicating that asset price movements are strongly correlated with
aggregate demand in most major economies1. In our model, the central bank takes into account
the e¤ect of wealth on aggregate demand, that is, it is fully aware of the e¤ect of st 1 on xt and
1See among others, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2005) for relevant empirical evidence considering the UK
economy, and Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) for international evidence. A recent study by the IMF (2003) points
out that equity price reductions are associated with heavy GDP losses.
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its magnitude. Futhermore, parameter 3 in the aggregate demand equation is of crucial interest
since it indicates the magnitude of the e¤ects of asset price movements on output. If there are no
wealth e¤ects/balance sheet e¤ects then 3 = 0 and Eq. (1:1) resembles a traditional dynamic IS
curve.
The specication of aggregate supply is given by:
t+1 = xt + t + "

t+1 (1.2)
where the supply shock " may be interpreted as a shift of the degree of substituability between
inputs in the production of nal goods, or an exogenous cost push shocks. Equation (1:2) is a
backward-looking NAIRU type Phillips Curve where the change in ination is a positive function
of the lagged output gap and the ination shock. Such a specication has also been adopted
by Ball (1999), Svensson (1997) and Rudesbusch and Svensson (1999). The presence of ination
inertia in the ination equation implies that disinations will be costly in terms of output losses,
thus there is a short-run trade-o¤ between ination and output. However, since lagged ination
enters equation (1:2) with unity coe¢ cient, the model implies a vertical long-run Phillips curve.
This process is also consistent with the empirical nding that ination in the major industrialised
countries is so highly persistent that it may indeed contain a unit root as some studies have shown
(see e.g. Grier and Perry, 1998). Equation (1:2) posits no role for expected future ination in
the ination adjustment equation. The parameter  is a positive constant which measures the
sensitivity of ination to excess demand2.
In empirical applications, more lags of output and asset prices (in the case of the IS curve)
and output and ination (for the Phillips curve) are often included to improve the empirical t.
Adding these lags will also induce a more persistent and therefore more realistic adjustment to
shocks. In empirical studies and monetary policy analysis sometimes concepts of equilibrium
and/or core ination are added to (1:2), to distinguish short-run uctuations of ination from
longer term, equilibrium ination. In our analysis this issue is not dealt with and ination (as all
other variables) is dened in terms of deviations from (possibly non-zero ination) steady-state
(see Vega and Wynne, 2003).
Following the current monetary policy analysis framework, one possible shortcoming of equa-
2As Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999) point out, there are good reasons to believe that a is not constant.
However, the assumption of linearity in the Phillips curve helps to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal
feedback rule.
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tions (1:1) and (1:2) is their relevance in the context of open economies, where international
trade is an important part of the economic activity and therefore, the exchange rate should be
considered as a signicant argument in policy function of open economies. However, using mod-
ied versions of equations (1:1) and (1:2), Ball (1999) does not nd important changes in the
interest rate movements for open and closed economies. On the other hand, using a forward-
looking perspective, Svensson (2000) nds varied benets of including the exchange rates in the
monetary rule in comparison with the original Taylor rule. In a similar way, Taylor (2001) nds
weak evidence for the exchange rate channel. Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) attempt to re-specify
Taylor-type rules for small economies using foreign variables. For the cases of Japan and Ger-
many, they use the US interest rate and the exchange rates in the interest rate rule and the
results show that the coe¢ cients may be small and signicant but in some cases, as for Germany,
the ination coe¢ cient is negative. Taylor (2001) suggests that the inclusion of the exchange
rate is not crucial for the monetary policy rule. As Rodriguez (2008), we consider the role of
the exchange rate explicitly in the empirical part in the Phillips curve. Futhermore, the role of
asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy has been recently controversial among economists
and central bankers. In fact, taking into account asset prices could be justied by the increasing
importance of securities in the nancial wealth of households and the high volatility of stock
prices in recent years. Unanticipated movement of asset prices may a¤ect the forecasts of the
central bank (Bernanke and Gertler 1999, Smets, 1997) because changes in asset prices can have
a direct impact on aggregate demand for goods. From the point of view of the households hand,
changes in stock prices and real estate prices may a¤ect expenditures on private consumption .
They can inuence saving decisions and modify the capacity of households to borrow and spend.
On the rms side, changes in stock prices and real estate prices can the ability of companies to
raise funds on the stock market or to borrow from banks. We add, in this study, a stock market
variable to analyze whether asset prices have an impact on the interest rate policy of the Bank of
Canada. Asset price changes also impact on real economic activity and, therefore, inuence the
output gap variable. Following Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2005) and Nisticò (2006), an asset
price equation is given by:
st = 1Ext+1   2(it   Et+1) + 3st 1 + "st (1.3)
where "s represents exogenous random shocks to asset prices. It can be interpreted as a
shock to the equilibrium real stock price value. Equation (1:3) can be separated into an asset
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price non-fundamental component and the fundamentals, where the asset price is fundamentals
plus variations of previous asset prices. Moreover equation (1:3) represents the Euler equation
displaying the dynamic evolution of asset prices and their underlying fundamentals. We assume a
partial adjustment mechanism of actual asset prices towards their fundamental value that allows
for the appearance of a bubble buildup. As equation (1:3) indicates, if asset prices have increased
in the past (st 1 > 0) there is a positive momentume¤ect on their current level (3 > 0). In
essence, investors bid up the demand for asset holdings in the expectation that past capital gains
will persist in the future. The higher the value of 3 the stronger the e¤ect from past asset price
changes, therefore st can diverge signicantly from its fundamental value. But once asset prices
revert, at an unknown future date, the downward e¤ect on aggregate demand could be large.
Stability of the asset price path requires that the parameter 3 satises: 0  3 < 1. Note that
1; 2 > 0:
2.2 The Policy Objective Function
Following standard assumptions in the empirical literature of monetary policy, the policymakers
preferences are modeled as an intertemporal loss function in which, at each period, the loss
function depends on both ination and output in relation to their target values, as well as the
smoothing interest rate and other potential variables (e.g., asset prices). Future values are dis-
counted at rate ; and the weights ; ; and  are nonnegative. As usual, we assume that
monetary policy is conducted by a central bank that chooses the sequence of short-term nominal
interest rates in order to minimize the present discounted value of its loss function. Rather than
assuming a quadratic form as is usual in the literature (see Svensson, 1997; Favero and Rov-
elli, 2003 and Rodriguez, 2008), we use a more general specication of the monetary authorities
objectives.
Loss = Et
1X

=0
h
(t+   )2 + bx2t+ +  (it+   it+ 1)2 + s2t+i (1.4)
In summary, the intertemporal optimization problem is then to minimize (1:12) subject to
the restrictions (1:9), (1:10) and (1:11). The problem is, then,
Min
it
Et
1X

=0
h
(t+   )2 + bx2t+ +  (it+   it+ 1)2 + s2t+i (1.5)
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subject to xt = xt 1   (it   t+1) + st + "adt
t = xt + t+1 + "
as
t
st = axt+1 + b (st 1   st 2)  c (it   t+1) + "st
After nding the rst-order conditions for optimality and after some manipulations, it is pos-
sible to obtain an interest rate rule. The parameters of this monetary rule are convolutions of the
coe¢ cients associated with the restictions under which the loss function has been intertemporally
optimized; that is they are convolutions of the parameters associated with the preferences of the
central bank (; ; ; ) and the structure of the economy (; ; ; ;  ; a; b; c):
Adopting the method of Optimal Control to solve this problem (see Chiang, 1992), we calculate
the rst-order conditions for the minimization of the loss function, which leads to the following
Euler equation:
0 =
266664
Et
1X
=0

h
(t+   ) @t+@it
i
+ Et
1X
=0

h
(xt+)
@xt+
@it
i
+Et
1X
=0

h
(st+)
@st+
@it
i
+ [ (it   it 1)  Et (it+1   it)]
377775 (1.6)
Because of the persistence in the structural equations of the economy, the Euler equation
has an innite horizon, and thus cannot be used directly in empirical work. To estimate this
equation it is necessary to truncate its lead polynomials at some reasonable temporal horizon.
As Favero and Rovelli (2003), we use a 4 quarters lead horizon. Two reasons stand in favour
of the lead truncation of the Euler equation: First, as Favero and Rovelli (2003) have argued,
a natural cutting point for the future horizon of the Euler equation emerges anyway, even if we
consider a theoretical innite horizon loss function. In fact, the weight attached to expectations
of future gaps and ination decreases as the time-lead increases, meaning that expectations of
the state of the economy carry less relevant information for the present conduct of policy as they
relate to periods further away in the future. Second, expanding the horizon in the Euler equation
would complicate it and bring collinearities to the system, causing great di¢ culties in making
estimations. It is worth noting that our option is consistent with the standard practice in the
estimation of forward-looking policy reaction functions. Boivin and Giannoni (2003) truncate the
forecast horizon at 1 quarter for output and 2 quarters for ination, while Muscatelli et al. (2002),
and Orphanides (2001 b) truncate the ination forecast horizon at 4 quarters. Rodriguez (2008)
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shows that estimated backward-looking policy reaction functions for US and Canada, strongly
indicate that actual policy decisions involve forecast horizons of ination not beyond 4 quarters
ahead.
Once the Euler equation is truncated at 4 quarters ahead, its partial derivatives components
can be expressed as functions of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply parameters, thus
building into the Euler equation the cross-equation restrictions. This ensures that the loss function
is being properly minimized subject to the constraints given by the economys structure.
0 =
266664
Et
4X
=0

h
(t+   ) @t+@it
i
+ Et
4X
=0

h
(xt+)
@xt+
@it
i
+Et
1X
=0

h
(st+)
@st+
@it
i
+ [ (it   it 1)  Et (it+1   it)]
377775 (1.7)
Expanding the partial derivatives, (1:6) turns into
0 =
2666666666666666666664
Et (t+2   )
h
@t+2
@xt+2
 @xt+2@it
i
+ 2Et (t+3   )
h
@t+3
@xt+2
 @xt+2@it
i
+3Et (t+4   )
h
@t+4
@xt+3

@xt+3
@it
+ @xt+3@xt+2 
@xt+2
@it

+ @t+4@t+3

@t+3
@xt+2
 @xt+2@it
i
+Et (xt+2)
h
@xt+2
@it
+ @xt+2@st+2 
@st+2
@it
i
+ 2Et (xt+3)h
@xt+3
@it
+ @xt+3@xt+2 
@xt+2
@it
+ @xt+3@st+2 
@st+2
@it
i
+ 3Et (xt+4)h
@xt+4
@xt+3

@xt+3
@it
+ @xt+3@xt+2 
@xt+2
@it

+ @xt+4@st+3

@st+3
@it
+ @st+3@st+2 
@st+2
@it
i
+Et (st+2)
h
@st+2
@it
+ @st+2@xt+2 
@xt+2
@it
i
+ 2Et (st+3)h
@st+3
@it
+ @st+3@st+2 
@st+2
@it
+ @st+3@xt+3 
@xt+3
@xt+2
 @xt+2@it
i
+ 3Et (st+4)h
@st+4
@st+3

@st+3
@it
+ @st+3@st+2 
@st+2
@it

+ @st+4@xt+4

@st+4
@xt+4

@xt+4
@xt+3
 @xt+3@it
i
+ [ (it   it 1)  Et (it+1   it)]
3777777777777777777775
(1.8)
Then, the IS curve equation, Phillips curve equation and Euler equation can be jointly esti-
mated as a system, generating estimates of the structural parameters c1 through c14, as well as
of the policymakers structural preferences parameters ; ; ; :
xt+1 = c1 + c2xt + c3xt 1 + c4 (it 1   t 1) + c5 (it 2   t 2) + c6st + "adt+1 (1.9)
t+1 = c7t + c8t 1 + c9xt + c104wt + "ast+1
st+1 = c11xt+1 + c12 (it 1   t 1) + c13 (it 2   t 2) + c14 (st + st 1) + "st+1
We rearranged Equation (1:7) and substituted derivatives with coe¢ cients from equation (1:8)
to obtain
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0 =
26666664
[ (it   it 1)  Et (it+1   it)] + 2Et (t+3   ) [c9c4]
+3Et (t+4   ) [c9 (c5 + c2c4) + c7c9c4]
+Et (xt+2) [c4] + 
2Et (xt+3) [c5 + c2c4 + c12c6]
+3Et (xt+4) [c2 (c5 + c2c4) + c6 (c12 + c12c14)]
+Et (st+2) [c12 + c4c11] + 
2Et (st+3) [c13 + c12c14 + c11c2c4]
+3Et (st+4) [c14 (c13 + c12c14) + c5c9c11]
37777775 (1.10)
Following Favero et Rovelli (2003), the parameters of the structural equations and the loss
function are estimated jointly from a system formed by system (1:8) and the Euler equation (1:9).
As we want to obtain the preferences implied by the coe¢ cients from the threshold regression
model, the dependent variable in the interest rate is the tted interest rates from the threshold
regression model including the lagged interest rates. Furthermore, to cover the di¤erent types of
asymmetry in the policymakers preferences identied in the literature, estimation is carried out
sequentially allowing each of the loss function weights ;  and  to vary with the state of the
corresponding target variable, and then concludes with a joint test. Statistical inference is based
on individual signicance tests and Wald tests.
2.3 The Data Set
The estimation is conducted on quarterly data for the Canadian economy, obtained from Statistics
Canada and the Bank of Canada, that spans the period from 1961:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Several di¤erent
methods have been proposed to measure the output gap (see Rodriguez, 2008). Our aim is not
to ascertain the way that real output evolves over the long-run. Instead, the goal is to obtain a
reasonable measure of the pressure felt by the Bank of Canada to use monetary policy to a¤ect
the level of output. Potential output is obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the
Canadian real GDP. The output gap is then constructed as the percentage di¤erence between
the logarithm of real GDP and its HP trend. We also consider a second measure of the output
gap construct by quadratic trend approach. Annual ination is measured as 100  (pt   pt 4) ;
where pt denotes logarithms of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The nominal interest rate is the
annual percentage yield on 3-month Treasury bills. Financial variables represent another group of
variables that have been recently considered in the specication of the Taylor rule for the analysis
of the behaviour of the Central Bank. In this paper, we consider the e¤ects of S&P/TSX. In
fact, the S&P/TSX composite index is an index of the stock prices of the largest companies
on the Toronto Stock Exchange as measured by market capitalization. We choose this index
because TSX listed companies in this index comprise about 70% of the market capitalization for
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all Canadian based companies listed on the TSX, thus it is the best nancial index which contains
the information that can help the Bank of Canada when making policy decisions.
To gain insight into the relatively history of monetary policy carried out by the Bank of
Canada, we take a look at stock prices (DSMPI1), interest rates (RON) in the Canada since
1961. The evolution of stock prices and interest rates during the period cover our study is shown
in gure 1. We show the stock prices level in deviation from its average over the sample period,
to get an idea of the size of peaks and troughs. The stock market peaked in 1983 with 2.9 points
deviations from the sample average and reached its trough in the end of 2007 with -1.8 points
deviation from average. Thus a boom as well as a bust in stock prices occurred. Volatility in stock
prices was considerable during the period of this research. The question is how did the Bank of
Canada respond to these stock price uctuations? Figue 1 also shows the interest rates in the
Bank of Canada that are e¤ectively targeted by Bank of Canada. The interest rate moves closely
around the renancing rate (overnight rate), which is the policy rate of the Bank of Canada. It
is apparent that the central bank raised interest rates in the beginning of 1981, while interest
rates decreased from the end of 2004 until 2008. This implies that monetary policy was tightened
during the stock market boom while it was eased afterwards. This behaviour of the Bank of
Canada is consistent with the alternative policy approach that includes stabilizing stock prices.
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The literature on monetary rules has suggested an estimation by subsamples, where the break
point is considered exogenous. In a recent paper, Rodríguez (2004) has estimated interest rate
rules for Canada and the US using endogenous break points selected by the approach suggested
by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). In general, his results show that the selected break dates are
consistent with what previous research has used for the US. Since in our paper we have a system
of three equations, while the Bai and Perrons approach is adequate for single equations, the
adequacy or possible modication of the approach to the system case is beyond the scope of this
empirical paper. Unlike Rodriguez (2008), we decided to use one break date selected for Canada
(1991:1). Note that an explicit ination target has been announced by the Canadian government
since 1991:1. The breakdown of the sample into two subperiods is meant to capture potential
di¤erences in the reaction function between the rst period, in which there was no explicit target,
and the second one which was characterized by an explicitly announced ination target. For the
whole sample period, as well as for both subperiods, the implicit ination target is estimated
along with the other parameters.
3 Empirical Evidence and implications
3.1 The statistical validity of the model
The descriptive statistics are presented in table (1:1) of the appendix. In short, data vary enough
so that one can apprehend relevant correlations between the dependent variable and explanatory
variables. Moreover the matrix of correlations between explanatory variables (Table (1:2) of the
appendix) suggests that the inclusion of all these variables in the same model poses no problem
of multicollinearity. Indeed, coe¢ cients of correlation appear quite low on the whole.
Knowledge of the integrational properties of the variables is important for the specications
of the econometric model. Given the implications for econometric modelling, we formally test for
unit roots, a necessary conditions for the use of the approach of Caner and Hansen (2004). In
order to investigate the stationarity of each time series that we are considering in this study, many
tests exist. Apart from the conventional augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) there is the
nonparametric test proposed by Phillips and Perron (PP) test (1988), the ADF statistic based on
the Generalized Least Squares detrending procedure proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock
(1996), and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test (1992). In contrast with
previous studies, we decide to run ADF and KPSS tests.
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Since considerable evidence exists that data-dependent methods to select the value of k are
superior to choosing a xed k a priori, we follow the recursive t-statistic procedure suggested by
Campbell and Perron (1991) and Ng and Perron (1995). Starting from a maximal order of k
(say kmax), the method tests if the last lag included is signicant, and if not, the order of the
autoregression is decreased by one and the coe¢ cient of the last lag is again examined. This is
repeated until a rejection occurs or the lower bound 0 is reached. In our case, we use a sequential
procedure suggested by Perron (1989). So we consider our kmax = integer
 
12 T100
 1
4 :
It is well known that ADF tests have low power with short time spans of data, and so we also
use the KPSS test developed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Unlike the ADF and PP tests, the
KPSS test has stationarity as the null hypothesis and a unit root as the alternative hypothesis.
As with the ADF and PP tests, the version of the KPSS test used here allows for drift but not
trend.
The results of the ADF, PP and KPSS tests for the variables, reported in Table 1:1 provide
evidence against the unit root hypothesis. For all the variables, we estimated the ADF, PP and
KPSS tests using only an intercept. With the ADF and PP tests, the unit root null can be
rejected at least at the 10% level for all variables. With the KPSS test, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of stationarity for the output, the stock market price index and the exchange rate at
the 1% level, for the ination rate, and the nominal interest rate at 10% and 5% respectively.
These ndings are consistent with the work of other researchers, and constitute a benchmark
consistent with a unit root in the variables.
Table 1.1: Unit root and stationarity tests
ADF PP KPSS
Test P-value Test P-value Test Level
Interest rate -1.814 0.373 -2.066 0.259 0.414 10%
Ination rate -2.032 0.273 -1.919 0.323 0.492 5%
Output gap 0.787 0.994 1.119 0.998 1.668 1%
Exchange rate -1.977 0.297 -1.870 0.346 0.966 1%
Stock Market Index -0.814 0.813 -0.815 0.812 1.678 1%
1% critical value -3.465 -3.465 0.739
5% critical value -2.877 -2.877 0.463
10% critical value -2.575 -2.575 0.347
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3.2 Estimates: Derivation of the preference parameters
Equation (1:10) is jointly estimated with the system (1:9), generating estimates of the coe¢ cients
describing the monetary policy regime -; ;  and - as well as of the aggregate demand, the
aggregate supply and the dynamic evolution of the stock market prices coe¢ cients. To estimate
our model specications for the Canada, we use the GMM procedure. The latter appears highly
adequate for our purposes because at the time of its interest rate setting decision, the central
banks cannot observe the ex-post realized right hand side variables. That is why the central
banks have to base their decisions on lagged values only (Belke/Polleit 2007). We decided to
use the rst eight lags of ination, the output gap and the stock prices and - whenever it is
added to the regression equation - the rst eight lags of the additional variable as instruments.
Moreover, we perform a J-test to test for the validity of over-identifying restrictions to check
for the appropriateness of our selected set of instruments. As the relevant weighting matrix we
choose, as usual, the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent HAC matrix by Newey
and West (1987). For comparison, in each estimation table, we include the estimation using
the total sample. The discount factor  is set to 0.975 for quarterly data, as is common in the
literature (see Dennis, 2001; Favero and Rovelli, 2003; Rodriguez, 2008)3. Notice that the sample
size constraints the number of instruments used in these cases and the estimates obtained are the
best considering these restictions.
Table 1:2 summarizes the results of estimation. Firstly, the change observed in the value of
 among subperiods reects a successful monetary policy. The ination target varies between
4:95% and 2:02%. On the other hand, the value of the coe¢ cient  indicates an increase in
the smoothing of interest rate between the pre-ination targeting period (1961:1-1990:4) and the
targeting ination period. The value of  implies a signicant decrease between the subperiods.
The value of  indicates a signicant reduction of the weight assigned to the nancial market in
the conduct of monetary policy for the second subperiod. This means that the central bank uses
an indirect mechanism, that of aggregate demand, to take into account the stock market in its
decision making. Moreover, the standard deviations of aggregate demand and supply suggest that
the economic conditions related to aggregate demand have been favourable in comparison with
those related to aggregate supply in pre-ination targeting period. In contrast, under ination
3Estimating  together with the model parameters leads to a slightly lower value between 0.94 and 0.96 without
changing the results. This accords with Favero and Rovelli (2003) who also found that qualitative results are not
sensitive to variations in the discount factor.
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targeting period, we observed reverse situation. The standard deviations of the monetary rules
indicates that monetary policy has been more successful in the ination targeting period. In
particular, observing this parameter, it seems that the pre-ination targeting period has been
characterized by a bad conduct of monetary policy. Better macroeconomic conditions are observed
from the side of aggregate demand in comparison with those from aggregate supply in the case
of full sample and pre-ination targeting period. The reverse situation is observed when the
ination targeting period. The empirical evidence suggests, without any doubt, that monetary
policy has been conducted e¢ ciently in the last subperiod.
The intuition and policy implications become clearer if aggregate demand is a¤ected by the
evolution of asset prices; then the monetary authorities should include asset price uctuations in
their optimal feedback rule and there should be a change in the distribution of the relevant interest
rate weights. This allows for asset prices to be considered as an element of the authoritiesreaction
function without necessarily implying, overall tighter than before, policy since the response to
ination and output will be less aggressive. In other words, our results imply that rst, asset prices
should have an independent role instead of being considered as instruments to help forecast output
and ination; and second, there should be a shift in the magnitude of reaction, away from the
traditional variables (ination, output gap) and towards a direct response to nancial instability.
Despite the highly stylized structure of the model, the results reveal several practical monetary
policy lessons. First, a monetary authority should generally respond to asset prices as long as
asset prices contain reliable information about ination and output. Second, this nding holds
even if a monetary authority cannot distinguish between fundamental and bubble asset price
behavior. Third, a monetary authoritys desire to respond to asset prices falls dramatically as
its preference to smooth interest rates rises. Finally, a monetary authority should not respond to
asset prices if there is considerable uncertainty about the macroeconomic role of asset prices.
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Table 1.2: Estimates of the preferences of monetary policy
No Breaks Two subperiods
1961:1-2008:4 1961:1-1990:4 1991:2-2008:4
Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
c1 0.025a (0:008) 0.101a (0:013) -0.074a (0:015)
c2 1.081a (0:008) 0.911a (0:009) 1.417a (0:029)
c3 -0.261a (0:007) -0.189a (0:006) -0.568a (0:028)
c4 0.026a (0:001) 0.059a (0:002) 0.034a (0:004)
c5 -0.044a (0:003) -0.071a (0:004) -0.010c (0:005)
c6 0.026a (0:009) 0.128a (0:018) 0.033c (0:018)
c7 1.133a (0:011) 1.175a (0:008) 1.069a (0:017)
c8 -0.143a (0:011) -0.180a (0:009) -0.148a (0:019)
c9 0.166a (0:004) 0.127a (0:003) 0.152a (0:009)
c10 0.009a (0:001) 0.011a (0:001) 0.011a (0:002)
c11 -01.07a (0:004) -0.100a (0:003) -0.446a (0:012)
c12 0.026a (0:002) 0.042a (0:0:001) 0.084a (0:008)
c13 0.049a (0:002) 0.064a (0:001) -0.008 (0:008)
c14 0.783a (0:005) 0.749a (0:006) 0.427a (0:017)
 0.9750e 0.9750e 0.9750e
 4.029a (0:007) 4.946a (0:047) 2.019a (0:021)
 0.024a (0:010) 0.017b (0:009) 0.051c (0:015)
 0.015a (0:001) 0.029a (0:001) 0.002a (0:001)
 0.336a (0:050) 0.664a (0:042) 0.236a (0:046)

 
ud

0.719 0.839 0.378
 (uo) 0.641 0.603 0.652
 (us) 0.433 0.370 0.632
 (um) 0.067 0.098 0.022
J-Statistic 25.001 14.446 9.439
a;b;c denotes signicance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. e indicates that the coe¢ cient has been imposed
in the estimation. Standard errors robust to serial correlation (up to 6 lags) in parentheses. J -statistic reports
Hansens test for over-identifying restrictions.
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3.3 Sensitivity to the approach in calculating the output gap
We now examine how the policy regime estimates change as the approach used to calculate the
output gap changed. Here we re-estimate the model while using the quadratic trend approach to
calculate the output gap. As before, the sample period is 1961:1 to 2008:4. Results are shown in
Table 1.3; standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 1.3 shows that qualitatively the results are not sensitive to the assumed approach used
to calculate output gap. In each case the weight on parameters stabilization are fallen between
the subpériods. The ination target varies between 4.41 % and 1.94 %. As in table 1.2, similar
observations are obtained. The values of the coe¢ cients ;  and  seem to suggest that reduced
smoothing of the interest rates is assigned by the central bank and slight weight to the output gap
and stock prices is also attributed. For example, the value of  indicates that the implicit target
has been reduced signicantly in the second subperiod. The value of  indicates a signicant
decrease of the weight assigned to the output gap in the conduct of monetary policy between
subperiods. What is more interesting is that the standard deviations of the monetary rule is close
to zero in the last subperiod, indicating that monetary policy has be successful in this subperiod.
Furthermore, the value of  goes from greater weight to a small one indicating that, in the pre-
ination targeting period, the monetary authority has given an important weight to the stock
market index price in the conduct of monetary policy, while, in the ination targeting period,
the evidence suggests that the monetary authority does not give directly any weight to the stock
market index price. This analysis demonstrates the extreme sensitivity of the estimates to the
di¤erent approaches in calculating the output gap. It is particularly the cases for the parameters
;  and : Another point is the fact that preferences of the monetary authorities have changed
drastically in the ination targeting period. It is clearly reected in the estimates of :
In general, the results of the estimation are very interesting. The estimation results give new
relevant insights into the inuence of stock market index prices on monetary policy in Canada.
These ndings about the role of stock market index prices for the Bank of Canada provide
relevant insights regarding the opportunities and limitations of incorporating nancial indicators
in monetary policy decision making. They also give nancial market participants, such as analysts,
bankers and traders, a better understanding of the impact of stock market index prices on the
Bank of Canada policy. We nd that over time, the Bank of Canada has assigned changing
weights to ination, the output gap and the stock market index price.
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Table 1.3: Estimates of the preferences of monetary policy
No Breaks Two subperiods
1961:1-2008:4 1961:1-1990:4 1991:2-2008:4
Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
c1 0.193a (0:010) 0.190a (0:014) 0.089b (0:039)
c2 1.181a (0:007) 1.142a (0:007) 1.546a (0:049)
c3 -0.222a (0:006) -0.203a (0:006) -0.561a (0:050)
c4 0.062a (0:007) 0.077a (0:003) 0.009b (0:004)
c5 -0.142a (0:005) -0.150a (0:004) -0.041a (0:013)
c6 0.116a (0:007) 0.206a (0:012) 0.061 (0:046)
c7 1.167a (0:010) 1.224a (0:007) 1.066a (0:045)
c8 -0.188a (0:010) -0.241a (0:001) -0.139a (0:053)
c9 0.041a (0:002) 0.047a (0:002) 0.020b (0:009)
c10 -0.012b (0:001) 0.014a (0:001) -0.007 (0:007)
c11 -0.006a (0:001) -0.003b (0:001) -0.007 (0:011)
c12 -0.048a (0:002) -0.062a (0:003) -0.023 (0:021)
c13 0.059a (0:002) 0.074a (0:004) 0.029 (0:020)
c14 0.874a (0:004) 0.855a (0:005) 0.912a (0:050)
 0.9750e 0.9750e 0.9750e
 3.447a (0:053) 4.411a (0:030) 1.937a (0:066)
 0.028a (0:001) 0.033a (0:001) 0.002b (0:001)
 0.002b (0:001) 0.003a (0:001) 0.000a (0:000)
 0.265a (0:014) 0.254a (0:0013) 0.002 (0:004)

 
ud

0.757 0.873 0.403
 (uo) 0.656 0.613 0.677
 (us) 0.479 0.424 0.555
 (um) 0.035 0.045 0.001
J-Statistic 37.909 14.455 15.911
a;b;c denotes signicance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. e indicates that the coe¢ cient has been imposed
in the estimation. Standard errors robust to serial correlation (up to 6 lags) in parentheses. J -statistic reports
Hansens test for over-identifying restrictions.
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4 Conclusion
What have we learned from this paper? There is strong evidence that Bank of Canada should take
into account asset price uctuations when setting interest rates. In other words, Bank of Canada
should care about the nancial instability associated with large asset price uctuations when
setting interest rate. This remark gives new relevant insights into the inuence of stock market
index prices on monetary policy in Canada. These ndings about the role of stock market index
prices on Canadian monetary policy provide relevant insights regarding the opportunities and
limitations of incorporating nancial indicators in monetary policy decision making. They also
give nancial market participants, such as analysts, bankers and traders, a better understanding
of the impact of stock market index prices on Bank of Canada policy. This is not the case in
the U.S. (see Castro, 2008). Indeed, it would seem that the Fed leaves those markets free from
any direct control. This di¤erence in the behaviour of the two central banks might be one of the
causes for the credit crunch that arose recently in the US housing market and that a¤ected the
real economy, with important repercussions in the world economy, but to which Canada remained
less exposed. Thus, the rst main contribution of this paper is that targeting nancial conditions
might be a solution to avoid the nancial and asset market instabilities and, consequently, to help
to avoid sharp economic slowdowns. However, we acknowledge that it may be di¢ cult to interpret
asset price movements and distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental components,
but the same type of uncertainty exists when policymakers are faced with stochastic trend output.
Hence, there is scope for the monetary authorities to take into account asset price uctuations in
the conduct of monetary policy despite the measurement errors that they might face.
There is strong evidence of change in the central banks target rate of ination towards the
end of the 1970s. In the pre-ination targeting period, we estimate the target rate of ination to
be 6.26 percent per annum. Since the ination targeting period, the target rate of ination seems
to be 1.96 percent per annum. This implies, without any doubt, that monetary policy has been
conducted e¢ ciently in the last subperiod. We nd strong statistical support for this decline and
the result is consistent with previous ndings by Rodriguez (2008). Whether the relative weight
that the Bank of Canada gives to output stabilization has fallen since the ination targeting
period becomes certain. Unlike Rodriguez we do nd sizeable (and signicant) estimate for 
and  leading us to conclude that the Bank of Canada does care about output and stock market
price stabilization (in addition to ination stabilization). Better macroeconomic conditions are
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also observed from the side of aggregate demand in comparison with those from aggregate supply
only in the pre-ination targeting period (1961:1 to 1990:4), while, the reverse situation is observed
in the targeting period (1991:2 to 2008:4).
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Appendix 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Interest Ination Stock Market Output gap Exchange
rate rate Index price rate
Mean 7.0457 4.1552 6.5498 0.0000 -0.2128
Std. Dev 3.6075 2.9879 17.1211 1.3724 5.1067
Minimum 0.9450 -0.0387 -54..6668 -5.4295 -20.7438
Maximum 21.0167 11.9524 58.2378 2.7919 17.8876
Jacques Bera 36.4621 32.1990 17.6103 15.6266 28.6247
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000
Obs. 192 192 192 192 192
Appendix 1.2: Correlation Matrix
Interest Ination Stock Market Output gap Exchange
rate rate Index price rate
Intrest rate 1.0000
Ination rate -0.9088 1.0000
Stock Market Index Price 0.3922 -0.1295 1.0000
Output gap -0.2687 0.0907 0.0892 1.0000
Exchange rate 0.3241 -0.0955 0.1808 0.1387 1.0000
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